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OBLIGATIONS VERSUS RIGHTS: 
SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WTO 





WTO law remains relatively uncontentious whereas international 
investment law elicits much more debate. This article posits that the 
differences in reception are attributable to deeper substantive 
differences about what is protected under each regime. In WTO law 
what is protected is the sum total of all commitments and 
concessions under the WTO Agreement, something that can be 
thought of as a “public” good. When a country injures that good, the 
remedy is for the country to cease the injury, a requirement that 
naturally places emphasis on obligation. In international investment 
law, by contrast, what is protected is individualized to a particular 
investor. The violation is evidently “private”. When a country 
injures that good, the usual remedy is compensation, a requirement 
that naturally places emphasis on the investor’s rights. This 
difference suggests that WTO law is primarily a law of obligation 
which is equality-oriented, prospective, constitutive and deductive, 
whereas international investment law is primarily a law of rights 
which is fairness-oriented, retrospective, contractual and inductive. 
A law of rights is subtractive, and to that extent, less stable. The 
identification explains why there have been recent moves to 
constitutionalize international investment law by introducing a 
greater degree of obligation. The change is meant to redress the 
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perceived jurisprudential imbalance in the field and strengthen its 
sense of community.  
KEYWORDS: international economic law, WTO, investment law, obligation, 
right, jurisprudence, theory 
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The law of international trade embodied in the World Trade 
Organization (hereinafter “WTO”) and international investment law are 
often compared and contrasted. However, the exact nature of their contrast 
is unclear.
1
 How do these two bodies of law differ, and why? Moreover, 
can the differences serve to explain why one body of law (WTO law) has 
on the whole been accepted and adopted much more readily than the other 
(international investment law)? 
These are important questions inasmuch as both trade and investment 
law disciplines have been regarded as central to globalization since the 
1980s. In the interim, however, they have generated starkly divergent 
reactions. On the one hand, the WTO and its legal system have come to be 
regarded as lynchpins in promoting the “stability and predictability” of the 
multilateral trading system. Since the conclusion of the WTO Agreement in 
1994 over 50 countries have acceded to the organization. On the other 
hand, international investment law attracts much less consensus. There 
continues to be much debate about the benefits of foreign investment.
2
 
Arbitrators assign different values to awards of compensation.
3
 A number 
of commentators have called for the regime’s reform, if not its wholesale 
abolition.
4
 A few countries have even gone so far as to denounce the 
keystone instrument in the field, the ICSID Convention.
5
 Nothing remotely 
                                                      
1  See for example Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and 
Investment Treaties, 102(1) AM. J. INT’L L. 48 (2008); Friedl Weiss, Trade and Investment, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 182 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 
2008); and JÜRGEN KURTZ, THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: CONVERGING 
SYSTEMS (2016). 
2 See discussion in JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW REGIME GOVERNING 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 18-24 (2011). 
3  Note the contrasting outcomes in Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, Final Award (Sept. 3, 2001), where the dispute was brought under the U.S.–
Czech Republic BIT and the tribunal dismissed the claims relating to a shareholding since there 
was no evidence “that any measure or action taken by the Czech Republic would have had the 
effect of transferring his property or of depriving him of his rights to use his property”, id. ¶ 202, 
and CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, where a dispute was brought under the Netherlands–Czech Republic BIT and the tribunal 
determined that actions and inactions of Czech officials affected the value of the investor’s 
shareholdings in the amount of $269 million. Zachary Douglas notes that the two cases involved 
“identical claims”. Zachary Douglas, Property, Investment and the Scope of Investment Protection 
Obligations, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY 
INTO PRACTICE 367 (Zachary Douglas et al. eds., 2014). For discussion, see id. at 367-69. 
4  See PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME—31 AUGUST 2010, 
https://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-statement-international-investment-regime-31-august-2010 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2017) (recommending that “States should review their investment treaties 
with a view to withdrawing from or renegotiating them in light of . . . concerns . . . [and] should 
take steps to replace or curtail the use of investment treaty arbitration.”).  
5 The ICSID Convention was denounced by Bolivia in May 2007, by Ecuador in July 2009 and by 
Venezuela in January 2012. The withdrawals were regarded as an expression of dissatisfaction by 
countries with elements of the “Washington Consensus”, of which investor-state arbitration is 
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similar has happened in relation to the WTO Agreement which, though not 
uncontroversial, continues to attract new members. The lingering question 
has to be why? 
In this article I posit that the differences in reception are linked to 
deeper substantive differences involving what is protected under each 
regime. In WTO law what is protected is the total sum of all commitments 
and concessions under the WTO Agreement, something that can be thought 
of as a public good. This is in the special and limited sense that it belongs 
to the “public” of the WTO membership. When a country injures that good, 
the remedy is for the country to cease the injury, usually by means of 
withdrawing or amending its law. That requirement naturally places 
emphasis on what a country must do, or in other words, on its obligations. 
In international investment law, by contrast, what is protected is 
individualized to a particular investor. In most instances the injury 
complained of involves an alleged interference with their interests or some 
degree of mistreatment that is considered to be a violation of the 
international minimum standard (hereinafter “IMS”) of treatment. The 
violation is evidently “private”. When a country injures that good or 
interest, the usual remedy is compensation. That requirement naturally 
places emphasis on the injury, and by extension, the investor’s rights. 
This pair of differences—of obligations and rights—can be traced to 
two very different models or visions of the law, one the alter ego of the 
other. What do I mean? As mentioned, it is possible to see how WTO law 
is primarily a law of obligation. It stresses what countries must do in future. 
It is also a law of equality in the sense that most of its major standards 
(Most Favoured Nation, National Treatment, Non-discrimination) are 
expressions of equality and its dispute settlement system is understood, at 
least notionally, to re-establish the “equality of competitive conditions”. 
The body of law is “constitutive” in that it sets forth broad norms of 
behavior. Finally, it is reasoned deductively, that is, from premises drawn 
from general law or principle. All of this suggests a model of law in which 
normativity is chiefly understood to be obligation-oriented, prospective, 
equality-driven, constitutive and deductive in nature. 
International investment law presents the obverse. It is chiefly a law of 
rights or interests. What the law is concerned with is the protection of those 
interests. When the law seeks to correct an injury done to an investor, it is 
implicitly making amends for the past. This correction might be thought to 
be equal to the injury suffered. However, because of the time value of 
money, litigation costs and pressure to settle, there is often a discount in 
investment awards so that the actual amount recovered by investors is 
                                                                                                                     
understood to be one. See Rodrigo Polanco Lazo, Is There a Life for Latin American Countries 
After Denouncing the ICSID Convention?, 11(1) TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1 (2014). 
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simply “fair”, or what is appropriate.
6
 International investment law is 
likewise considered “contractual” in the sense that it emanates from 
bilateral agreements between countries. Finally, the law is logically 
inductive, that is, it is reasoned from multiple prior instances proven true 
which are combined to achieve a specific conclusion. All of this suggests a 
model in which normativity is chiefly understood to be rights-oriented, 
retrospective, fairness-driven, contractual and inductive in nature. 
The foregoing two models of normativity are intriguing inasmuch as 
they present opposing yet complementary understandings of what the law 
might be. We can see, for instance, how the two models, taken together, 
present a series of neatly opposing pairs (obligation-right, future-past, 
equality-fairness, constitution-contract, deduction-induction) that provide a 
relatively complete picture of what the law is. Although this simple 
division might be challenged as a cartoon of what the law really is—after 
all, WTO law contains rights and investment law contains obligations—the 
division is useful in that it highlights the leading tendencies of the law 
generally and how they relate to one another. I will suggest that the exact 
position of any legal system will be somewhere between the two modes of 
law I have outlined above. That is, its precise degree of obligation- or right-
orientation will be relative. 
But why should this dual structure matter? And how is it related to the 
issue of regime acceptability highlighted at the outset of this article? Here I 
will suggest that international investment law is controversial because what 
is usually at issue in investor-state arbitration is rights—essentially claims 
that emphasize “competing rather than unified positions”.
7
 Hence, the body 
of law is fragmented and pluralized. In many instances it is hard to know 
exactly what the law of international investment is. 
All of this is ultimately a reflection of its community. The term 
“community” is used in many different ways today. However, in the sense 
used here, it refers to what actors hold in common. Simply put, actors hold 
much less in common in international investment law than they do in WTO 
law. Recent moves to constitutionalize international investment law are 
likely a recognition of the need for more obligation—in essence, more 
“community”—in the field. 
This article is divided into four parts. Following this Introduction, Part 
Two examines the respective development of WTO and international 
investment law. Part Three examines the way in which WTO law is chiefly 
obligation-oriented, prospective, equality-driven, constitutive and 
deductive, and conversely, the way that international investment law is 
chiefly rights-oriented, retrospective, fairness-driven, contractual and 
inductive. The distinct nature of international investment law means that it 
                                                      
6 Jeffrey Standen, The Fallacy of Full Compensation, 73(1) WASH. U. L.Q. 145, 225 (1995). 
7 PETER GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 10 (2014). 
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is hard to understand as an ordered system, lacks precedent, and is 
characterized by substantial diversity. Part Four goes on to examine why 
reform and “constitutionalization” are now being discussed with such 
vigour in international investment law and how this is likely to move the 
law in a direction that is more obligation- and community-oriented. 
II. WTO AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: DIFFERENT 
DEVELOPMENT, DIFFERENT DESTINATIONS 
To understand the difference between WTO and international 
investment law it is necessary to have some idea of their respective 
development. The origins of the WTO Agreement lie in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter “GATT”), a treaty concluded 
between 23 governments in 1947.
8
 The treaty’s immediate aim was to 
promote stability in international trade relations and thereby avoid the 
variable economic behaviour that had led to political extremism and global 
conflict in World War II. 
Policy makers who designed GATT concluded that the most effective 
way to promote stability in international trade relations was to oblige 
member countries to “bind”—or fix—their tariffs at individually negotiated 
levels. Thus, the centerpiece of GATT was the requirement in GATT Art. 
II that members not exceed their individually negotiated tariff rates. An 
additional requirement was the obligation in GATT Art. I for members to 
extend their best, or “most favoured”, tariff or treatment (hereinafter 
“MFN”) to the remainder of the GATT membership. The key obligations of 
GATT Arts. I and II were complemented by a national treatment obligation 
under GATT Art. III to treat imports as well as domestically produced 
goods and a general obligation under GATT Art. XI to eliminate quotas. 
GATT Arts I-III and XI were supplemented by a range of other trade-
related rules. Some involved trade administration, such as the freedom of 
transit (GATT Art. V), transparency (GATT Art. X), exchange 
arrangements (GATT Art. XII) and state trading activities (GATT Art. 
XVII). Others involved disciplines on non-tariff barriers such as safeguards 
(GATT Art. XIX), anti-dumping and countervailing action (GATT Arts. 
VI, XVI). The purpose of these additional rules was to prevent the erosion 
of the original tariff concessions. 
The focus on obligations under GATT is traceable to the treaty’s 
emphasis on stability.
9
 A bound tariff undertaken by the U.S. is not merely 
                                                      
8 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
9 “Most studies of WTO governance and institutional reform concur that a core purpose, if not the 
core purpose of the WTO . . . should be to protect a stable, multilateral, rules-based approach to 
international trade.” Carolyn Deere Birkbeck, Reinvigorating Debate on WTO Reform: The 
Contours of a Functional and Normative Approach to Analysing the WTO System 9 (Glob. Econ. 
Governance Programme, Working Paper No. 2009/50, 2009).  
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about imports today. Rather, it is principally a promise by the U.S. 
government to treat imports in a certain way in future. That promise gives 
security to producers and exporters in other countries that their goods will 
encounter a foreseeable kind of treatment when entering the U.S. The tariff 
therefore serves as an important basis for upstream decisions about 
investment, production and exports.
10
 
The WTO Agreement was concluded at the end of the Uruguay Round 
(1986-94) to consolidate GATT and to make number of improvements to 
the functioning of the GATT system. The WTO Agreement merged 
existing GATT obligations into a “single undertaking”, thereby replacing 
the patchwork that had arisen under GATT and its side codes, and extended 
basic GATT disciplines to a wider range of goods, services and intellectual 
property than had been the case previously.
11
 A streamlined dispute 
settlement system was introduced. 
The resulting engagement strongly emphasizes what WTO members 
share in common. Negotiated reciprocity remains formally important 
within the scheme of the treaty, but with the obligation to extend 
concessions via MFN to over 160 countries, it has lost much of its original 
significance. In effect, WTO concessions have become so diffuse that they 
are hard to quantify. The real value of the endeavour lies in all that has 
evolved, which includes tariff concessions as well as many evolved 




To determine whether countries are living up to their undertakings, a 
system of panels arose under GATT Art. XXIII that sought to determine 
whether national measures “nullified or impaired” a country’s GATT trade 
commitments. However, the quality of outcomes under panels was uneven 
and individual decisions were sometimes vetoed by defendant countries.
13
 
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) addresses many of 
these problems by streamlining dispute settlement procedures, removing 
the veto to dispute settlement results and introducing the option of appellate 
                                                      
10  See generally Warrick Smith & Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Understanding the Investment 
Climate, 42(1) FIN. & DEV. 40 (2005). 
11 Over several decades GATT had evolved into an unwieldly array of instruments involving 
GATT 1947, a number of side codes and other commitments. One of the functions of the WTO 
Agreement was to consolidate these in a single undertaking. The original GATT also applied to 
goods alone. In the WTO Agreement parallel disciplines were introduced covering services and 
intellectual property.  
12 For use of the term “acquis” in WTO practice, see Appellate Body Report, United States — 
Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from 
Korea, ¶ 174, WTO Doc. WT/DS202/AB/R (adopted Mar. 8, 2002); Appellate Body Report, 
United States — Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶ 160, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS344/AB/R (adopted May 20, 2008).  
13 In the 48-year history of GATT 101 of 132 panel reports were adopted. See WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT BODY DEVELOPMENTS IN 2011, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/spee 
ch_johansen_13mar12_e.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2017). 
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review. WTO members continue to be able to take each other before panels 
(as they did under GATT) when there is reason to believe that the domestic 
law of another member country “nullifies or impairs” benefits accruing 
under the treaty. Panel proceedings may be followed by an appeal to the 
Appellate Body. If a violation is identified, a recommendation is normally 
made to the defendant country to bring its law “into conformity” with the 
WTO Agreement. This is forward-looking and implicitly invites the 
countries to negotiate so as to settle their disputes inter se. In response, 
countries have worked out a number of forward-looking, transformative 
solutions to WTO disputes.
14
 
Why is the desire for settlement so pronounced in WTO law? 
Settlement is important in any legal system because it is synonymous with 
communal peace, but it assumes additional importance in WTO law 
because of the need for the preservation of legal relationships. This is acute 
in a legal regime characterized by uninterrupted application.
15
 In the Anglo-
                                                      
14  One source on transformative justice has observed: “A transformative approach to conflict 
resolution would encourage accommodative relationships between groups with competing 
interests. The conflict situation would be transformed from one in which groups are in competition 
with one another to one in which groups recognize their mutual interests in arriving at workable 
solutions.” LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, FROM RESTORATIVE JUSTICE TO TRANSFORMATIVE 
JUSTICE (1999). What are distinctive features of transformative outcomes in WTO law? First, in 
virtually all instances strict compliance with the treaty has not been achieved. Rather, countries 
have used the “substance of a conflict as a means of exploring options and establishing responses”. 
There is no absolute requirement of compliance. Instead, the law remains pliant. It constitutes a 
basis for discussion as opposed to a target to be met. Second, the amount of trade involved in the 
disputes is of secondary, even diminished, importance. Outcomes are a considerable distance from 
estimates of “value of trade blocked”, the “equality of harm”, or the “amount of subsidy conferred” 
that might be focused on to determine the purpose of WTO law, dispute settlement and 
countermeasures. In many instances they exhibit considerable creativity and imagination. As a 
result, relationships are “develop[ed] and strengthen[ed]”. In the process, interdependence is 
promoted. Third, parties assume responsibility for crafting an outcome. They become true 
architects of their relationships going forward. They must listen to their counterparts and be 
prepared to accommodate more than their own interests, including potentially—and from a 
normative perspective, most intriguingly—the general interest in non-compliance. An example of 
transformation occurred in U.S. — Shrimp, WT/DS58, a dispute that involved a complaint by India, 
Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand against U.S. legislation (and U.S. court decisions made pursuant 
to it) imposing a ban on the importation of shrimp not caught in a “turtle friendly” manner. In 
settlement of the case the U.S. agreed to modify its program to allow greater flexibility for foreign 
shrimping regimes to meet the U.S. criteria. It also provided certain technical assistance to fishing 
fleets in claimant states. In addition, the U.S. concluded the Inter-American Convention for the 
Protection of Sea Turtles with American and Caribbean partners and later an Indian Ocean and 
South East Asian Marine Turtle Memorandum of Understanding with Asian and Australasian 
partners in order to promote turtle conservation globally. These last two initiatives were undertaken 
to fulfill an expressed preference in the Appellate Body report for “consensual means of protection 
and conservation”. Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp 
and Shrimp Products, ¶ 172, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998). 
15 WTO members must comply with their WTO obligations “cumulatively and concurrently”, a 
compliance frame which differs significantly from other bodies of law, such as international 
criminal law, whose jurisdiction is generally episodic (i.e., on the happening of certain events) and 
residual (i.e., only where, in most instances, national authorities are unable or unwilling to 
prosecute). 
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American common law, for instance, private law is predicated upon a view 
of individuals as autonomous bearers of rights and obligations who are 
relatively interchangeable.
16
 If one party breaches an agreement or commits 
a wrong, the solution in most instances is damages since another party can 
always be found to fulfill the original obligation.
17
 No continuing 
relationship is foreseen.
18
 WTO law is different. It applies to highly 
subjective and idiosyncratic relations among countries. In most instances 
the specific rights and obligations cannot be fulfilled by another country. 
Due to MFN a settlement will confirm rights and obligations among the 
immediate parties as well as among the membership as a whole. To that 




In contrast, the origins of international investment law lie in diplomatic 
protection. Under international law a home state was allowed traditionally 
to intervene on behalf of its nationals with investments in a host state.
20
 
This power was recognized for the purpose of avoiding discrimination 
                                                      
16 An indication of the difference is reflected in the remedies available in WTO (and international 
trade) law versus international investment law. In WTO (and international trade) law the “default” 
remedy involves withdrawal of a law. Thus, DSU Art. 3.7 provides that “the first objective of the 
dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned . . . .” 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.7, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
401 [hereinafter DSU]. In international investment law the typical remedy is payment of damages, 
reflecting a corrective and “atomistic” view of legal relations. Countries are under no obligation to 
amend their laws. 
17 In tort, for instance, “The general object of an award of damages is to compensate the claimant 
for the losses, pecuniary and non-pecuniary, sustained as a result of the defendant’s tort.” CLERK & 
LINDSELL ON TORTS 1883 (Anthony M. Dugdale & Michael A. Jones eds., 20th ed. 2010). 
18 The preference of compensation over specific performance is evident in the U.S. Restatement of 
Contracts (2d) which references compensation ahead of specific performance. Thus, section 345 
notes that “[i]n most contract cases, what is sought is enforcement of a contract. Enforcement 
usually takes the form of an award of a sum of money due under the contract or as damages. . . . A 
court may also enforce a promise by ordering that it be specifically performed or, in the alternative, 
by enjoining its non-performance. In doing so, it protects the promisee’s expectation interest.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345 cmt. b (1981). 
19  A similar distinction is sometimes made in German law between Begriffsjurisprudenz and 
Interessenjurisprudenz. Writing in 1975 René David described the distinction as follows: “There is 
a general tendency to think not in terms of rights but rather, following Ihering, in terms of mere 
‘legally protected interests’, and to endow rights with limits, with ‘relative character’, with 
‘functions’, thus modifying profoundly not only their content but their very nature. According to 
this new theory the mission of law no longer appears as the protection of the egoistic interests 
constituted by absolute prerogatives belonging to men . . . The function of the law becomes more 
the balancing of conflicting interests . . . .” RENÉ DAVID, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW: VOLUME II 1-24 (1975). 
20 For an overview of the evolution from diplomatic espousal to investor-claims, see ANDREW 
PAUL NEWCOMBE & LLUÍS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 1-73 (2009); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International 
Investment Agreements, 12(1) UC DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL. 157 (2005); William S. Dodge, 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-
United States Free Trade Agreement, 39(1) VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5-14 (2006). 
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against foreign nationals and the possibility of prejudice in host state 
proceedings. Foreign government intervene had shortcomings, however, 
notably in the requirement of diplomatic espousal. 
During the 19th century diplomatic espousal was dispensed with in 
some cases. A few investor claims did proceed in this way and a modest 
body of case law came into existence.
21
 In the usual instance, an investor 
would pursue action against a host state before an arbitral tribunal alleging 
breach of an investment agreement or the international minimum standard 
of treatment. Over time, countries began to do away with the requirement 
of espousal. What resulted was a direct right of action by investors against 




Under the typical investment treaty an investment claim arose when a 
host state had failed to protect an investment or to accord the necessary 
standard of treatment. By definition, therefore, an investment claim dealt 
with events in the past. It was inherently backward-looking. 
“Pastness” is vital to appreciating the particular form that international 
investment law came to assume. The law’s orientation to the past helped to 
fix the interests in issue. They become well-defined, discrete and unitary. 
The injury could be sharply delineated in time and space. As a result, they 
were amenable to classic corrective justice.
23
 Corrective justice is 
problematic, however, to the extent that it espouses zero-sum outcome. A 
country’s loss in arbitration could be construed as a specific investor’s gain, 
redolent with connotations of private benefit and favoritism towards 
foreign investors. 
Eventually, the need for certainty in international investment law 
prompted countries to negotiate bilateral investment claims procedures 
which took a more elaborate form in bilateral investment agreements. 
These agreements increased substantially in number after 1959.
24
 In 1966 
                                                      
21 NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 20. 
22  CAMPBELL MCLACHLIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE 
PRINCIPLES 5 (2007). 
23 These circumstances correspond to the five basic ideas around which corrective or compensatory 
justice is organized: 1) that the event producing the injury is both discrete and unitary, 2) that the 
injury is sharply defined in time and space, 3) that the defendant’s conduct has clearly caused the 
harm suffered, 4) both plaintiff and defendant are easily identifiable, 5) apart from the goal of 
compensation, existing rights are held constant. The law is not to engage in any kind of social 
reordering or social management except in so far as those functions are logically entailed by the 
principle of compensation. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 319 (1993). 
24 As Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell note:  
 
Germany is commonly cited as the first state to develop a BIT program and to sign the 
first BIT, with Pakistan, in 1959. The Treaty between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Pakistan for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (Germany-
Pakistan (1959)) contains many of the substantive provisions that have become 
common in subsequent BITs. 
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the creation of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (hereinafter “ICSID”), an arm of the World Bank, introduced a 
common framework for many investment arbitration proceedings.
25
 
Proceedings under ICSID were slow to begin but by the early 2000s had 
become popular among investors. 
Today the substance of international investment law focuses on the 
elaboration of an IMS of treatment that is to be accorded to investors. The 
standard is understood to be customary and therefore constantly evolving.
26
 
Thus, investors and investments are entitled to the IMS, but what the IMS 
consists of in any given instance has to be worked out case-by-case.
27
 
In an earlier era the IMS was defined largely in terms of 
nationalizations and expropriations involving specific “takings”—that is, 
the taking of property. As government behavior has become more wide-
ranging and sophisticated, however, there has been pressure for the IMS to 
respond to a broader range of official behavior. Today the IMS has 
effectively splintered into a series of sub-standards that have an uncertain 
relationship with the IMS. The outcome is a more fragmented, less 
conceptually coherent IMS, especially as the focus of international 
investment law shifted from a concern with protection to a concern with 
treatment.
28
 The resulting sub-standards are classed in two categories: 
contingent and non-contingent. In the case of contingent sub-standards the 
particular standard, such as MFN, is linked to a comparator that is different 
from national treatment. In the case of non-contingent standards, such as 
Fair and Equitable Treatment (hereinafter “FET”) or Full Protection and 
Security (FPS), the substandard is not linked to a specific comparator but is 
instead considered absolute. 
                                                                                                                     
 
NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 20, at 42. As of 2014 UNCTAD indicated that there were 
3,271 international investment agreements (2,926 BITs and 345 “other” international investment 
agreements). UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015, at 106 (2015). 
25  ICSID was established by multilateral treaty in 1965 provide facilities for conciliation and 
arbitration of investment disputes between contracting states and individuals and companies that 
qualify as nationals of other contracting states. ICSID does not conciliate or arbitrate investment 
disputes itself. Instead, this task is left to individual conciliation commissions or arbitral tribunals, 
most of which are appointed ad hoc. As of mid-2016 161 countries had signed and/or ratified the 
ICSID Convention. Since 1978 ICSID also administers certain proceedings between states and 
nationals of other states outside the scope of the Convention under a set of procedures known as the 
Additional Facility Rules.  
26 MCLACHLIN ET AL., supra note 22, at 21, 205 et seq.; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 20, 
at 236. 
27 Andrew Newcombe and Lluís Paradell note that “[t]he substantive content of the minimum 
standard . . . is usually not specified in any detail.” They go on to note that “the content of the 
minimum standard has been and remains contentious.” NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 20, at 
234. 
28 IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 2 (2008) (noting that in the early 1980s “[t]he focus of . . . international 
rules shifted from the protection of investment to the treatment of investment”). 
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Surveyed side-by-side, WTO and international investment law are very 
different. One of these differences is the nature of the underlying good, or 
‘thing’, protected by the law. In WTO law, as explained, the good arises 
out of obligations belonging to the WTO membership as a whole. It is the 
sum of all concessions and commitments made by WTO members. This 
inevitably places emphasis on obligations that are “public” and non-
transferable, and in so being, attracts the application of distributive justice. 
The final product is emblematic of widespread consensus about the worth 
of the WTO Agreement. 
In international investment law, by comparison, the “good” is normally 
conceived of as the protection of specific investments composed of rights 







 It also frequently involves 
the treatment of investors. Due to that private emphasis—of what is “mine, 
not yours”—there is bound to be more dissent about the law and its general 
merits. 
III. TRADE AND INVESTMENT: SOME SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES 
The net result of the above differences means that the starting point of 
theoretical reflection—the sense of what is common, or “community”—is 
more diluted and harder to discern in international investment law than in 
WTO law. Perhaps the most graphic indicator of this is the fact that rather 
than being termed an ordered “system”, international investment law is 
often described as constituting a diffuse “framework” or “regime”.
32
 How 
                                                      
29 Claims for intellectual property in international investment law have been relatively rare until 
recently. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The Protection of Intellectual Property and 
International Investment Law, 19(1) J. INT’L ECON. L. 87 (2016). For discussion, see Susy Frankel, 
Interpreting the Overlap of International Investment and Intellectual Property Law, 19(1) J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 121 (2016); Ramesh Karky, Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Investment 
Agreements, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
REFLECTING POLICY THROUGH CHANGE 209 (Mark Perry ed., 2016); and Lahra Liberti, 
Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment Agreements: An Overview (OECD, 
Working Papers on International Investment No. 2010/01, 2010). Nevertheless, some guidelines 
for the valuation of intellectual property have been provided. See International Valuation Guidance 
Note No. 4: Valuation of Intangible Assets, in INTERNATIONAL VALUATION STANDARDS 245 
(2007). 
30  IRMGARD MARBOE, CALCULATION OF COMPENSATION AND DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 110 (2009); BORZU SABAHI, COMPENSATION AND RESTITUTION IN INVESTOR-
STATE ARBITRATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 94-101 (2011). 
31 MARBOE, supra note 30, at 287; SABAHI, supra note 30, at 130. 
32  There has been much speculation about whether it is appropriate to refer to international 
investment law as a “system”. See Christoph Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger, A Doctrine of 
Precedent?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 1, at 
1188, 1189 (noting that “[t]he system, if it can even be called a system is, of investment treaty 
arbitration is not unitary in the sense of each tribunal sitting under the same source of 
jurisdiction.”). 
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else do the two bodies of differ at the level of substance? 
A. Obligation Versus Right 
I have already pointed out that the two bodies of law differ most 
fundamentally with respect to their jurisprudential orientation. WTO law is 
overwhelmingly focused on obligations whereas international investment 
law is focused on rights. 
What does it mean to say that a legal system is a law of rights? A right 
is commonly defined as a “claim”, that is, a legally protected interest 
allowing the right-holder to “obtain certain willing and acting from another 
person.”
33
 In the case of WTO law the “willing and acting” in question 
requires a country to bring themselves “into conformity” with the WTO 
Agreement, usually through withdrawal or amendment of national law. In 
many instances it has resulted in arrangements that, though not completely 
compliant, all WTO member countries can live with. Thus, formally 
inconsistent bans on hormone-treated meat or clove cigarettes have been 
allowed to remain in place.
34
 
In the case of international investment law the “willing and acting” 
normally assumes the form of compensation. Compensation tends to dilute 
the force of the rights in question since a government is not required to do 
anything in a positive legal sense like amending or withdrawing legislation. 
Instead, it is simply required to pay compensation. The wrong itself may 
continue. That is far from obtaining “certain willing and acting”. 
B. Future Versus Past 
Another difference between the two bodies of law pertains to their 
temporal direction. The importance of the future in WTO law arises from 
the scheme of the WTO Agreement itself. What is most relevant to the law 
as a normative phenomenon is the “security and predictability” of 
“reciprocal and mutually advantageous [trade] arrangements”. The concept 
has been repeatedly referenced in a line of WTO cases and is now 
understood to serve as a constitutive idea for the treaty as a whole.
35
 The 
                                                      
33 PHILIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 161 (1990). 
34 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Measures Concerning Meat and Meat 
Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R (adopted Feb. 13, 1998); RENÉE JOHNSON, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40449, THE U.S.–EU BEEF HORMONE DISPUTE (2015); Appellate Body 
Report, United States — Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 24, 2012); U.S. Settles WTO Clove Cigarette Case with 
Indonesia; Keeps Ban in Place, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 10, 2014. 
35  Panel Report, Korea — Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶ 10.81, WTO Doc. WT/DS75/R 
(adopted Feb. 17, 1999), cited in Panel Report, European Communities — Selected Customs 
Matters, ¶ 7.431, WTO Doc. WT/DS315/R  (adopted Dec. 11, 2006) and Panel Report, China — 
Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
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basic idea is to create an environment in which trade will flourish going 
forward. 
By comparison, an investment claim typically arises when a host state 
fails to protect an investment or to accord the necessary standard of 
treatment. By definition, therefore, an investment claim deals with events 
in the past. The particular nature of the interests involved that focus on the 
past means that international investment law is substitutive. The law seeks 
to compensate for breaches which have already happened. 
Retrospectivity has other consequences. One of these involves 
precedent, or the reach of the past into the present and future. WTO law has 
developed a relatively strong doctrine of precedent in line with its character 
as a highly integrated legal system.
36
 The strength of the doctrine can be 
linked to the WTO system’s insistence on “stability and predictability”. 
The same impulse is harder to discern in international investment law since 
the body of law emanates largely from ill-defined custom and a loose 
“network” of treaties. Within this structure, at least theoretically, individual 
investment awards should not matter much to each other since different 
decisions are sourced in different treaties. 
However, the proliferation of investment arbitration in the last three 
decades has repeatedly raised the issue of precedent. Arbitrators generally 
recognize that “[r]eliance on past decisions is a fundamental feature of any 
orderly decision-making process” and that such reliance “[s]trengthens the 
predictability of decisions and enhances their authority.”
37
 At the same 
time, arbitrators and commentators have had difficulty describing what has 
arisen as strict precedent and have instead concluded that what has arisen is 
more akin to the jurisprudence constante of civil law. The reason given for 
this particular development is the bilateral nature of the applicable treaties, 
the limited multilateralism of the investment regime, and the absence of an 
appellate structure. The absence of appeals, in particular, means that 




                                                                                                                     
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶ 7.1463, WTO Doc. WT/DS363/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2010). 
For extensive comments, see Panel Report, United States — Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 
1974, at 321 n.663, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R (adopted Jan. 27, 2000). “The purpose of many of 
the GATT/WTO disciplines, indeed one of the primary objects of the GATT/WTO as a whole, is to 
produce certain market conditions which would allow this . . . activity to flourish.” Id. ¶ 7.73. 
36 See for example Panel Report, United States — Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel 
from Mexico, ¶ 7.105, WTO Doc. WT/DS344/R (adopted May 20, 2008) (observing that “even 
though the DSU does not require WTO panels to follow adopted panel or Appellate Body reports, 
the Appellate Body de facto expects them to do so to the extent that the legal issues addressed are 
similar.”). 
37 Schreuer & Weiniger, supra note 32. 
38  See Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty 
Arbitration and International Law, at 13, Presented at the 18th ICCA Congress: International 
Arbitration 2006: Back to Basics? (June 3, 2006), in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2006: BACK 
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C. Equality Versus Fairness 
As mentioned, WTO law is largely a law of equality. Its chief 
standards are equality-driven.
39
 Its defaults are likewise predicated on the 
idea of equality.
40
 WTO dispute settlement aims to re-establish the 
“equality of competitive conditions”.
41
 Its equality orientation coheres with 
                                                                                                                     
TO BASICS? 879, 889 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2007) (noting that “good awards will chase the 
bad, and set standards which will contribute to a higher level of consistent quality.”).  
39 This is evident in requirements of MFN and national treatment, which are together often placed 
under the general umbrella term of non-discrimination, as well as equivalence, harmonization and 
mutual recognition. For a discussion of non-discrimination in WTO law, see WILLIAM J. DAVEY, 
NON-DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE RULES AND EXCEPTIONS 
(2012). 
40 Where the WTO Agreement text is silent, panels and the Appellate Body have developed a 
number of equality-related standards such as “evenhandedness”, “balance” and “parallelism” which 
project equality in situations of uncertainty. This practice appears to underline equality’s 
constitutive nature. The term “even-handed” has been used by panels in varying situations 
suggesting either equal or fair treatment. See for example Appellate Body report, United States — 
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, at 21, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R 
(adopted May 20, 1996); Appellate Body report, United States — Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, ¶ 148, WTO Doc. WT/DS184/AB/R (adopted Aug. 
23, 2001). “Parallelism” has been identified as an obligation arising under WTO Safeguards 
Agreement Art. 2. The obligation of parallelism mandates that where, for the purposes of applying 
a safeguard measure, a WTO member has conducted an investigation considering imports from all 
sources, that member may not, subsequently, exclude imports from free trade area partners from 
the application of the safeguard. For discussion, see Appellate Body report, United States — 
Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, ¶¶ 433-74, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R, WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, 
WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R, WT/DS259/AB/R (adopted Dec. 10, 2003); Appellate Body 
report, United States — Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon 
Quality Line Pipe from Korea, ¶¶ 178-81, WTO Doc. WT/DS202/AB/R (adopted Mar. 8, 2002). 
Panels and the Appellate Body most often have referred to the concept of “balance” as a general 
requirement of WTO dispute settlement—namely, that dispute settlement results should not upset 
the balance of rights and obligations attained in the WTO Agreement. See DSU, supra note 16, art. 
3.3. 
41 In Panel Report, Japan — Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS44/R (adopted Apr. 22, 1998) for instance, the Panel noted: 
 
[W]e consider that this standard of effective equality of competitive conditions on the 
internal market is the standard of national treatment that is required, not only with 
regard to Article III generally, but also more particularly with regard to the “no less 
favourable treatment” standard in Article III:4. We note in this regard that the 
interpretation of equal treatment in terms of effective equality of competitive 
opportunities, first clearly enunciated by the panel on U.S. — Section 337, has been 
followed consistently in subsequent GATT and WTO panel reports. 
 
Id. ¶ 10.379. The Appellate Body quoted from Report of the Panel, United States — Section 337 of 
the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶ 5.11, L/6439 (Jan. 16, 1989), GATT BISD (36th Supp.), at 345 (1990), at 
length, noting how it explained the relevant test “in very clear terms”:  
 
[T]he “no less favourable” treatment requirement set out in Article III:4, is 
unqualified. These words are to be found throughout the General Agreement and later 
Agreements negotiated in the GATT framework as an expression of the underlying 
principle of equality of treatment of imported products as compared to the treatment 
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the law’s prospectivity and its aspiration to achieve equality in some more 
rational future. 
International investment law, by contrast, is largely fairness-driven. 
Fairness is an elusive concept. In English usage what is “fair” is taken to be 
fitting or appropriate.
42
 We say, for instance, that a particular transaction is 
“fair”, meaning that it is suitable for all concerned. This is not the same as 
saying that it is optimal. A fair transaction will simply be unobjectionable. 
The foregoing observations infer that fairness is highly variable. The 
FET standard—the most popular standard pleaded in international 
investment law disputes today—is perhaps the best indicator of that 
variation. Commentators generally acknowledge that FET’s application 
“will always remain a highly case specific exercise.”
43
 A flexible approach 
to the standard’s interpretation that blends the terminological references of 
“fairness” and “equity” with a range of other considerations seems fitting. 
These include legal uncertainty, denial of due process, official coercion or 
harassment, stability of the legal framework, unjustifiable enrichment, bad 
faith, lack of transparency, and arbitrary or discriminatory treatment.
44
 
The inherent variability of decisions on FET has generated 
considerable controversy. A number of civil society groups have expressed 
concern about increasing abuse of the FET clause in recent investor-state 
proceedings. The reaction appears to be evidence of a broader communal 
expectation about the need for stability in arbitral decision-making. 
Much of the concern about FET appears to stem from the bare 
language of first-generation FET clauses. These have been described as 
“prone to expansive interpretation simply because an arbitral tribunal does 
not have sufficient interpretive guidance from the treaty.” As Mark 
Jennings notes, “[t]he first-generation of BITs ‘[m]ost commonly’ required 
that FET be provided to cover investments ‘without defining the standard 
in terms of any other standard’.”
45
 In some cases the FET clause in a treaty 
is linked to a particular substantive norm like non-discrimination whereas 
in others it is linked to the less well-defined customary IMS. This variation 
causes problems when, inevitably, one tribunal seeks to apply the 
                                                                                                                     
given either to other foreign products, under the most favoured nation standard, or to 
domestic products, under the national treatment standard of Article III. 
 
42 “Fair . . . free from bias, fraud or injustice; equitable, legitimate.” Fair, THE OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY: VOLUME V 671 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989). Legal 
dictionaries offer a slightly different definitions. “Fair means . . . 1. impartial; just; equitable; 
disinterested; 2. Free from bias or prejudice . . . .” Fair, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 615 (Brian 
Garner ed., 9th ed. 2009); “Fair means . . . reasonable.” DAPHNE DUKELOW, Fair, THE 
DICTIONARY OF CANADIAN LAW 432 (4th ed. 2011). 
43 GEBHARD BÜCHELER, PROPORTIONALITY IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 3 (2015). 
44 TUDOR, supra note 28, at 154-81. 
45 Mark Jennings, The International Investment Regime and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: 
States Bear the Primary Responsibility for Legitimacy, 17(2) BUS. L. INT’L 127, 136 (2016). 
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interpretation arrived at under one treaty in the context of another. 
D. Constitution Versus Contract 
The idea of WTO law as a “law of obligation” referenced above 
foreshadows how WTO law and the WTO Agreement can be understood as 
constitutive. A constitution is defined as “[t]he fundamental laws of a state, 
governing the actions of officials and the making and execution of laws. A 
constitution is the organization of a government . . . .”
46
 
The WTO legal system is most evidently constitutive in the way that it 
binds adherents to a single undertaking in which all obligations apply 
“concurrently and cumulatively”.
47
 This application is, of course, the 
product of MFN, various non-discrimination requirements, and standards of 
harmonization, equivalence and mutual recognition. Those requirements, 
taken together, impose a “unity” of obligation upon members. In addition, 
there are other factors within the treaty which work to reinforce the idea of 
unity. First, the obligations themselves must be appreciated within the 
context a legal order which is generally difficult to modify or amend. 
Second, the attitude developed by WTO panels and the Appellate Body 
towards the interpretation of WTO law has been exclusivist and generally 
wary of external interference. 
International investment law, by comparison, appears heavily 
contractual. It is sourced largely in bilateral treaties concluded between 
pairs of countries that bear a certain resemblance to contracts. They are 
concluded between defined parties. They are understood to create rights 
and obligations for the parties alone. They may be amended or terminated 
according to their terms. In all of these respects, investment treaties place 
emphasis on the text as an expression of will. 
                                                      
46 Constitution, THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY: VOLUME 1 221-22 (Stephen 
Michael Sheppard ed., 2011).  
 
[T]he constitution of every government is essentially the customs and expectations 
shared by officials and the governed, often based on a document, according to which 
officials act and limit the scope of others’ actions with the support of different 
officials and the people who are governed by them. Constitutions therefore depend on 
the commitment of officials and of the people to be sustained, regardless of the 
language in constitutional texts. 
 
ALLAN HUTCHINSON, EVOLUTION AND THE COMMON LAW 199 (2005). A constitution is also 
undoubtedly concerned with the future: “A constitution . . . is drafted with an eye to the future. Its 
function is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power 
and, when joined by a Bi1l or a Charter of Rights, for the unremitting protection of individual 
rights and liberties.” Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 155 (Can.), cited in ALLAN 
HUTCHINSON, EVOLUTION AND THE COMMON LAW 203 (2005). 
47  Panel Report, United States — Sunset Reviews of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil Country 
Tubular Goods from Argentina: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Argentina, ¶ 7.129, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS268/RW (adopted May 11, 2007).  
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The will-driven aspect of the law is not simply evident at the level of 
treaties or their interpretation. It is also apparent among those who pursue 
arbitration under them. Private parties have substantial flexibility in 
crafting their claims, a freedom that contributes substantially to the shaping 
of the law. As José Alvarez notes, “who is entitled to bring claims . . . 
matters a great deal with respect to the intensity with which issues may be 
pursued, the prospect of annulment or enforcement challenges or for 
settlement, and the likelihood that litigants will raise ‘political’ or other 
extraneous issues in the course of adjudication.”
48
 
The result is an autonomy that is at times disquieting, as Alvarez notes:  
 
The intrusive nature of many of these [investment] claims—
involving challenges to environmental regulations, to the way 
States conduct administrative proceedings at all levels of 
government, or to national measures taken to handle a 
financial crisis—is exacerbated by the unpredictability of the 
resulting awards. And the prospect of more arbitral precedents 
seem all the more troubling when these involve the 
application of vague standards such as fair and equitable 
treatment by ad hoc panels of three that only come together to 





The unconstrained freedom—even license—of international investment 
law has provoked questioning of the basic contractualist assumptions 
underpinning the regime. First, there has been greater acknowledgment of 
its link to public international law. Thomas Wälde and others point to the 
growing recognition of international investment agreements as part of 
international law and therefore more properly influenced by interpretive 
approaches based upon canons of international law.
50
 Second, there is the 
tendency to regard certain awards or “lines” of awards as setting down, or 
at least reflective of, customary international law. Traditionally, it was 
relatively easy to characterize investment treaties as creating lex specialis 
among the parties to them. By doing so, they were taken to have 
“contracted out” of international law. The more modern view is to see this 
practice is taking place within the broader corpus of international law and 
recognizes the intertwined nature of conventional and customary sources. 
Thus, Alvarez argues, for instance, that “[i]t may be misleading to state, as 
                                                      
48 ALVAREZ, supra note 2, at 48-49. 
49 Id. at 56. 
50  Thomas W. Wälde, Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experience and Examples, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 724, 729 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 
2009).  
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a leading casebook does, that [bilateral investment treaties] ‘[a]s lex 
specialis between the parties . . . supersede any inconsistent customary 
international law and the embrace or exclude any incipient norms’ . . . . The 
language of most BITs welcomes or even requires the residual application 
of customary international law . . . it is much harder to point to concrete 
instances where such treaties explicitly exclude it.”
51
 Third, wariness of 
easy contractual analogies has important consequences for the sources of 
international investment law. Whereas many commentators appear to 
assume that the proliferation of investment treaties is leading to wholesale 
“treatification”, that is, a kind of takeover of the field by conventional 
sources, some have questioned this opinion. That is for the simple reason 
that treaties themselves are interpreted against a greater background of 
customary sources. 
Still, there are good reasons to continue treating international 
investment agreements as grounded in consent, that is, not to overstate the 
role of custom. First, custom is famously vague. To the extent it is hard to 
discover, custom serves as an imprecise basis for expectations about the 
normative framework, and ultimately, the arrangement of obligations and 
rights. Not surprisingly, arbitrators have tended to shy away from custom 
regardless of doctrinal purity.
52
 Second, many existing investment 
agreements were concluded in an era when including such agreements was 
considered the “thing to do” from a political or reputational standpoint.
53
 
There was little sense that they were legally binding. For this reason, a 
measure of interpretive restraint may be in order. That realization translates 
most directly into respect for their consensual origins. Third, a related point 
is that states parties to investment treaties are distinct “communities”. As 
such, their policy preferences often reflect those of a government which is 
entitled to a measure of deference. International investment law exhibits 




E. Deduction Versus Induction 
Law is normative, and it is often said to be so because it can be 
distinguished from fact.
55
 The difference between law and fact means that 
                                                      
51 ALVAREZ, supra note 2, at 116 n.213. 
52 Id. at 230. 
53 “Today’s follow (and largely copy) standard language that was developed in the late 1950s and 
1960s when such treaties were in practice in effect more political goodwill statements than legally 
binding and enforceable treaties.” Wälde, supra note 50, at 737.  
54 See generally BÜCHELER, supra note 43. 
55 “Nobody can deny that the statement: ‘something is’—that is, the statement by which an existent 
fact is described—is fundamentally different from the statement: ‘something out to be’—which is 
the statement by which a norm is described.” HANS KELSEN, A PURE THEORY OF LAW 5-6 (1967). 
The distinction between fact and law is particularly relevant to the work of the Appellate Body, 
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the law must have a method of identifying, organising and appreciating the 
facts.
56
 The totality of these methods is referred to as the law’s rationality. 
There are two dominant rationalities in law, deductive and inductive. In 
deductive logic reasoning “entails establishing a framework and then 
applying the framework to a problem.”
57
 In deductive logic mental patterns 
are established and then projected in the form of specific rules. 
WTO law is weighted in favour of deductive logic in the sense that it 
relies heavily on presumption. This is for several reasons. First, deduction 
is particularly important in WTO law because real-world statistics and 
other evidence may not adequately convey the trade effects of government 
measures.
58
 Second, the preventative function is important in WTO law. 
WTO law is not concerned with mechanics of competition in specific 
instances or the impairment of trade flows per se, but with the maintenance 
of broad conditions of competition and hence threats to potential trade. 
Some means are needed to apprehend injury and this normally happens 
through the operation of assumptions. Third, the machinery of WTO 
dispute settlement is equipped with limited fact-finding ability.
59
 In many 
cases dispute settlement outcomes depend on what countries choose to 
disclose, meaning there is a need for inferences that operate in the absence 
of fact. 
                                                                                                                     
since DSU Art. 17.6 observes that “[a]n appeal shall be limited to issues of law covered in the 
panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.” DSU, supra note 16, art 17.6. In 
practice, the distinction between fact and law can be a fine one. In U.S. — Aircraft the Appellate 
Body observed that it is often “difficult to disentangle legal conclusions or legal reasoning from 
factual findings.” Appellate Body Report, United States — Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), ¶ 958, WTO Doc. WT/DS353/AB/R (adopted Mar. 23, 2012).  
56 Philip Allott observes that “all the discourse of the public mind is structured around the capacity 
of the human mind to universalize the particular and particularize the universal.” PHILIP ALLOTT, 
THE HEALTH OF NATIONS 269 (2002). 
57 ROGER MARTIN, THE OPPOSABLE MIND 144-45 (2007). 
58 Reference is often made to the GATT cases of Report of the Panel, Japan — Measures on 
Imports of Leather, L/5623 (Mar. 2, 1984), GATT BISD (31st Supp.), at 94 (1985), and Report of 
the Panel, United States — Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, L/6175 (June 5, 
1987) GATT BISD (34th Supp.), at 136 (1988). In the latter case the panel “concluded from its 
review . . . that, while the Contracting Parties had not explicitly decided whether the presumption 
that illegal measures cause nullification or impairment could be rebutted, the presumption had in 
practice operated as an irrefutable presumption.” Id. ¶ 5.1.7 (emphases added). 
59 “The DSU does not give panels and the Appellate Body powers of investigation comparable to 
those of domestic courts; they merely have the right to seek information from any individual or 
body, but they do not have the power to force individuals to testify before them.” Frieder Roessler, 
The Concept of Nullification and Impairment in the Legal System of the World Trade Organization, 
in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 140 (Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997). This limited ability has been hampered in some cases by claims of 
privilege and the need for Highly Confidential Business Information (HCBI) and Business 
Confidential Information (BCI). The Appellate Body has also noted the power of panels to draw 
adverse inferences. See Appellate Body Report, Canada — Measures Affecting the Export of 
Civilian Aircraft, ¶¶ 181-206, WTO Doc. WT/DS70/AB/R (adopted Aug. 4, 2000); Panel Report, 
Turkey — Measures Affecting the Importation of Rice, ¶¶ 7.90-106, WTO Doc. WT/DS334/AB/R 
(adopted Oct. 22, 2007). 
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By contrast, in international investment law the need for proof arises 
from the requirement of causation. An aggrieved investor needs to furnish 
evidence that the host state has caused the injury complained of before it 
can seek compensation. 
In most instances the evidence presented in international investment 
law is tested by adversarial process. The process is described by Borzu 
Sabahi as follows: 
 
[V]aluation experts usually present their assessments of what 
a particular enterprise or investment is worth or how the 
losses should be valued in the form of expert witness 
statements. These assessments may take into account a variety 
of data obtained from market and from other sources, 
including the parties. The assessments, however, ultimately 
require the exercise of judgment by the valuers. The opposing 
parties’ valuers usually provide diverging forecasts about the 
value of investment at issue. Cross-examination of valuation 
experts helps to highlight the strong and weak points of the 
expert’s assessments, particularly by testing the assumptions 





On the basis of the evidence put forward, arbitrators will arrive at a 
reasonable estimate of the damage. An award of compensation will follow. 
The focus on valuation in international investment law means that the 
law tends towards empiricism. Empiricism is hampered, however, by the 
natural uncertainty of calculation and the need for baseline hypotheticals in 
that calculation. What is the correct hypothetical? Which version of the 
“past”—perfect profitability, investment cost, or constructed value—should 
be chosen in order to assess compensation? There are no easy answers. In 
many instances, arbitrators have shied away from full valuation of 
investments and inclined toward something less, again, in line with the idea 
of “fairness” noted above.
61
 
IV. WTO AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: CONTRASTING 
COMMUNITIES 
The differences I have just highlighted are noteworthy both because of 
                                                      
60 SABAHI, supra note 30, at 184. 
61  MARBOE, supra note 30, at 3 (noting that “in international [investment] jurisprudence the 
amounts awarded often remain[] below the actual loss suffered”); SABAHI, supra note 30, at 128 
(noting, for instance, that international law “allows equity to some extent to correct the otherwise 
inevitable perpetuation of a hard deal in favor of the government.”). 
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the way they draw out a contrast between the two bodies of law and 
because the way that their essential differences can be understood as falling 
on opposite sides of a normative divide. The reason for the divide lies in 
the nature of community and the way in which each community has come 
to view the basic “good” involved. In WTO that good is unitary and 
relatively well-understood. It receives strong support from all members. In 
international investment law, that is less evident, principally because the 
relevant community is harder to discern. 
The subject of community is familiar in conservation biology, wherein 
it has been observed:  
 
Small societies occupying a small island or homeland can 
adopt a bottom-up approach to environmental management. 
Because the homeland is small, all of its inhabitants are 
familiar with the entire island, so that they are affected by 
developments throughout the island, and share a sense of 
identity and common interests with other inhabitants. Hence 
everyone realizes that they will benefit from sound 




The anthropologist Raymond Firth noted these conditions on Tikopia, a 
small island in the Solomons Archipelago, where land is allotted with an 
eye to efficient use, crops are planted to maximize nutritional value, and 




To analogize, the 160-odd members of the WTO might be thought of 
as “Tikopians”. They know each other and possess a remarkable degree of 
agreement and value about core disciplines under the treaty, and by 
extension, the importance of community. Members also agree in large part 
on conservation and careful management of what is shared, and for this 
reason, on the necessary “stability and predictability” of expectations. 
International investment law possesses little such conservation ethic. It 
possesses no single treaty text or institution. Claimants do not know each 
other and typically have an adversarial relationship with defendant states. 
Consequently, they have no collective interest in moderating their claims. 
Competition abounds. The result is that the nature of community and its 
attendant expectations are much more diffuse. 
                                                      
62 JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED 277-78 (2005). 
63 See RAYMOND FIRTH,  WE, THE TIKOPIA: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF KINSHIP IN PRIMITIVE 
POLYNESIA xxi (1936). Firth took his title from the phrase “Matou nga Tikopia” (i.e., “we 
Tikopians”) because of his observation that it was constantly used by individual Tikopians to 
explain their perception of things and therefore indicative of the way that individual and communal 
identity are fused in Tikopian culture. 
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The ethos in international investment law might be likened to the 
situation that prevailed on Easter Island off the coast of Chile, where 
anthropologists speculate that the failure of groups to cooperate in 
exploiting natural resources—in essence, zealous promotion of their 
rights—eventually led to environmental devastation and communal 
collapse.
64
 Easter Island’s indigenous population, traditionally 
characterized by competing clans, was only reconstituted through 
centralized military leadership (matatoa) that provided a modicum of 
protection until the arrival of European explorers in the 18th century.
65
 
Not surprisingly, the intensive rights-based ethos of international 
investment law, the unevenness of its jurisprudence and its “scorched 
earth” litigation tactics have generated a countermovement.
66
 This approach 
appears to demand greater consideration of the public interest within what 
is a largely private system of investor protection, more transparency and 
direct attention to public interest issues in investment decision-making, as 
well as the proposed creation of a global investment court to standardize 
arbitral outcomes. Behind the countermovement seems to be a perception 
of imbalance between “public” and “private” in international investment 
law, at least as it currently stands, and necessarily and derivatively, a need 
to rebalance this “law of rights” to make it more obligation-oriented. 
In particular, to instill more certainty in investor state arbitration, three 
possibilities are contemplated. First, there is the option of official 
interpretations. For example, a treaty like the NAFTA contains a 
mechanism whereby member countries can adopt binding interpretations of 
the treaty. So far, in the case of NAFTA, this method has been used only 
once. Christoph Schreuer and Matthew Weiniger have expressed the view 
that such an interpretative mechanism allows parties to “[i]nfluence the 
outcome of judicial proceedings” and is therefore “[i]ncompatible with 
principles of a fair procedure and hence undesirable.”
67
 Second, there is the 
option of an appeals procedure. This would allow consistent review of 
arbitral decisions. For over a decade a number of U.S. bilateral investment 
treaties have foreseen this possibility and contained language to like effect. 
The idea has now borne fruit in efforts by the EU, begun in 2014, to create 
such an appellate mechanism linked to the conclusion of its own bilateral 
investment treaties and possibly housed in the WTO. However, as of early 
2017 the outcome of the EU’s effort has been delayed due to general 
uncertainty over trade initiatives. Third, drawing on experience with 
preliminary rulings in EU law, a further option would be to introduce a 
parallel system of preliminary rulings in international investment 
                                                      
64 DIAMOND, supra note 62, at 79 et seq. 
65 Id. 
66 ALVAREZ, supra note 2, at 49. 
67 SCHREUER & WEINIGER, supra note 32, at 1201. 
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arbitration. As Schreuer and Weiniger explain it, “[u]nder such a system, a 
tribunal would suspend proceedings and request a ruling on a question of 
law from a body established for that purpose.”
68
 Such a system would have 
to confront the fact that that most investment treaties are carefully tailored 
to the particulars of the bilateral relationship they emanate from—an 
example of their “contractual” character previously mentioned—and, while 
they employ similar language, are not exactly the same. This fact suggests 
real limits to the degree of interpretive homogeneity that could be expected 
from such a system. 
However, until more is done to achieve consistency, international 
investment law’s community will be one that is resistant to the creation of 
concrete expectations. A comparison helps to illustrate the point. GATT 
Art. XXI provides certain security exceptions under the treaty. It has rarely 
been invoked under GATT or the WTO Agreement. In one notable 
instance—retaliation by certain countries in response to Argentina’s 
invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas in 1982—a number of influential 
countries maintained that the provision was self-judging.
69
 Today GATT 
Art. XXI is viewed by most commentators as the “ripcord” of the system. 
Countries are exceedingly cautious about its use, no doubt in the realization 
that regular invocation could undermine the entire system.
70
 
This is to be contrasted with the behavior of Argentina in several 
investment disputes. There, Argentina felt relatively unconstrained in 
invoking a necessity defence—the nearest investment law equivalent to 
GATT Art. XXI—in a succession of investment claims, no doubt aware 
that it's actions would merit lesser scrutiny in a more diffuse community, 
backed up by the weight of opinion—and perhaps a little viveza criolla 
(native cunning)—that it’s defence was justified.
71
 Simply put, the diluted 
                                                      
68 Id. at 1204. 
69  Thus, in GATT Council discussions in 1982 concerning trade restrictions applied for 
noneconomic reasons by the European Economic Community [hereinafter EEC]:  
 
[I]ts member states, Canada and Australia against imports from Argentina . . . the 
EEC stated that: “the EEC and its member States had taken certain measures on the 
basis of their inherent rights, of which [GATT Art. XXI] was a reflection. The 
exercise of these rights constituted a general exception, and required neither 
notification, justification or approval . . . this procedure showed that every contracting 
party was—in the last resort—the judge of its exercise of these rights.” 
 
WTO, GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX: VOLUME I 1600 (1995). See generally also Michael J. Hahn, 
Vital Interests and the Law of GATT, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 558 (1991). 
70 Peter Lindsay, Note: The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure?, 
52 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1302 (2003) (noting how WTO members have infrequently invoked GATT 
Art. XXI, usually in conjunction with diplomatic solutions beyond the WTO that reflect the 
provision’s “constructive ambiguity”). 
71 For an explanation of the role of “native cunning” in Argentina’s economic policy, see Bello: 
The Luis Suárez of International Finance, ECONOMIST (July 5, 2014), http://www.economist. 
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nature of the community allowed a country like Argentina to expect that its 
actions would be advantageous and would have no serious long-term 
repercussions. To date, that estimate appears to have been borne out.
72
 
In short, without a greater degree of community in international 
investment law expectations will remain in flux and dissatisfaction with the 
regime will persist. The distinction between obligation and right is 
instructive in the way that it illuminates this phenomenon and much else 
that is distinct about two communities—those of WTO and international 
investment law. 
  
                                                                                                                     
com/news/americas/21606268-argentinas-debt-stand-reflects-teenage-attitude-rules-are-there-be-br 
oken-luis. 
72  In four disputes—CMS v. Argentina, LG&E v. Argentina, Enron v. Argentina, Sempra v. 
Argentina—U.S. based companies asserted that Argentina’s emergency measures violated the FET, 
umbrella, non-discrimination, and expropriation guarantees of the Argentina–U.S. bilateral 
investment treaty. In each case arbitrators found a violation of FET and umbrella clauses and 
awarded significant amounts of compensation. Each award was later annulled pursuant to a 
procedure in ICSID Art. 52. For an overview, see generally Paul B. Maslo, Are the ICSID Rules 
Losing Their Appeal? Annulment Committee Decisions Make ICSID Rules a Less Attractive Choice 
for Resolving Treaty-based Investor-State Disputes, 54 VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. DIG. 1 (2014). See 
also ALVAREZ, supra note 2, at 247 et seq.  
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